men run up tiny flags and fix gold price
Five men met this morning for 27 minutes and told the world the price of gold here. They've been doing it for years, they said. And it didn't matter that the world gold market was in a state of flux, rising from the United States peg -$35 an ounce -all the way to $41 an ounce in yesterday's feverish trading. The five men, impeccably attired in dull gray and black, assembled at Rothschild's, around an austere table in the financial district.
Each had before him a miniature Union Jack, the British flag, on a tiny flagpole with two strings attached. Solemnly they raise their flags and the meeting was on. They put together all their buying and selling instructions and decided that gold at the moment was worth $36.40 an ounce. Each lowered his Union Jack to show the decisions had been reached and the meeting was ended. They went off to their respective firms, Mocatta & Goldsmid, which is 278 years old; Samuel Montagu; Sharps Pixley; Johnson Matthey; and of course, the host, N.M. Rothschild, merchant and banker. This week's remarkable activity in the gold market was a nuisance to them. Usually they deal in terms of a penny or two an ounce. Suddenly Swiss buying to soak up excess foreign currency, plus rumors of possibly a devalued United States dollar, shot the price up to a spread of $2 an ounce. A spokesman for Rothschild's said it was so busy that it had little time to sit around and talk about the gold rush. In fact the daily meeting of the gold brokers had not time for its usual tea or exchanges on any other subject. As soon as they said gold In October 1960, the pricing ceremony described above in the Chicago Daily Tribune , the London Gold Fixing (LGF), captured the world's attention as the price of gold increased dramatically above the international monetary system's statutory level ($35 per ounce of gold). Broader concerns that the United States' (US) large balance of payments deficit threatened international liquidity were behind such price movements. In a situation reminiscent of contemporary debates about the dollar, if the deficit remained elevated, then the ability of the US to maintain the value of its currency would be undermined. Unlike today, however, the gold-dollar nexus was at the centre of the post-Second World War monetary order, and if the price remained at such elevated levels the stability of the system would be questioned.
As indicated by the attention paid to the LGF in October 1960, this daily ritual producing a publicly visible gold pricing benchmark was a key arena in which the drama of confidence in international liquidity was played out. What is perhaps surprising is that according to the standard rubrics measuring the importance of a market, the LGF was in fact insignificant. It was not characterized by robust turnover and it did not produce profitable transactions for its participants. The traditional factors used to explain the existence and rationale of markets had disappeared. Why, then, did the LGF still manage to operate and produce a gold pricing benchmark that attracted so much international attention?
The continued functioning of the LGF during the period was due to its importance as a cultural object, as opposed to a pecuniary rationale. Even though the prices discussed in the Chicago Daily Tribune were quoted in dollars, all trading in the LGF was transacted in Britain's currency, the pound sterling. The Bank of England, an important participant in the LGF, supported the continued existence of the market due to the trading forum's connection with sterling. More specifically, senior central bank staff felt that the establishment of a sterling price for gold in the pricing ceremony augmented the prestige and status of that currency. So the LGF survived because of its symbolic significance, as opposed to its centrality as a gold trading venue, its establishment of an important price, or the dealing profits earned by its participant firms.
